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past decade in North America . Civil libertarians, for example, attack
psychiatry in almost all its forms of practice . It would be a pity if this
pressing controversy about psychiatry's role and function in relation
to the legal process were reduced to ideological rhetoric .
DAVID N. WEISSTUB *
Felony and Misdemeanor : A Study in the History of Criminal Law.
By JULIus GOEBEL . Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania
Press . 1976 . Pp . xlv, 455 . (No Price Given)
This is a reprint of a book first published in 1937 and is one of a
series on medieval history published or re-issued by the University
of Pennsylvania Press . Many of the books are of interest to legal
historians ; these include studies of the Burgundian Code and the
Lombard Laws, and three volumes of Henry Charles Lea's excellent
study called Superstition and Force which examines the. duel, the
oath, the ordeal and torture .
Julius Goebel intended Felony and Misdemeanor to be the start
of a trilogy on the history of English criminal procedure but the
Second World War and other historical pursuits prevented comple-
tion .
In an introductory essay, Edward Peters pays tribute to this
remarkable scholar who took great pains to examine the history of
the law in the broadest possible perspective . Felony and Mis
demeanor is a difficult book because it presumes much knowledge in
the reader and also shows the remarkable depth and breadth of
Goebel's research and scholarship .
This re-review can hardly say anything new or original about
Felony and Misdemeanor because it was very fully and favourably
reviewed forty years ago by scholars much better-equipped to assess
its many good qualities .' Instead, I would like to spend more time on
the ideas and work of the legal historian Goebel, who died five years
ago . 2
'k David N . Weisstub, of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, and of the Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, University of Toronto .
' E.g . Jolliffe, Book review (1938), 38 Col. L. Rev. 1039 ; Riesenfeld, Book
review (1938), 26 Cal. L. Rev. 405 ; Kantorowicz, Book review (1938), 11 Camb . L.
J. 446; Plucknett, Book review (1938), 54 L.Q . Rev . 295. All commented that
Goebel may have been a little harsh in his criticism of his protagonists in the peace
debate . Riensenfeld and Kantorowicz complained that Goebel's scholarship suffered
from an almost impenetrable density so that occasionally the footnotes on philology
and medieval historical sources tend to create an imbalance.
' See Smith, Julius Goebel, Jr . -ATribute (1973), 73 Col. L. Rev. 1372, for a
biographical sketch of his life .
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Goebel's greatest contribution was to correct the impediments
under which legal history had suffered . First, legal history,
particularly in Germany had suffered from large generalizations
which were not supported by equal development in cultural studies
and anthropology . Secondly, German legal history too frequently
imposed a nineteenth century standard of historical and anthropolog-
ical change on the very different societies of the early medieval
period . A final disadvantage, as Peters shows (in his Introduction to
this reprint) was "the authority of the legal profession . . : which
tended either to surround legal history with the arcana of profes-
sional discourse or to satisfy itself with a -perfunctory `historical
introduction' to internal principles of contemporary law wholly
without. reference, to changing concepts of historical interpreta-
tion" .' Goebel, in his usual pungent style, -.also commented on
lawyers' history as a ritual, which ; has become "a matter of
mechanical gesture, bereft of all piety, . pervaded with pettifoggery"I
and said that there were too, many who being "untouched by any
sense of historical .values, they treat the growth of doctrine as
something projected,on :a horizontal plane of rational manipulation
unmindful of its . perpendicular support in time or circumstance' . . 5,
Goebel' also . questioned the reverence. in which judicial pro-
nouncements were held and the "intellectual tyranny" which they
exert:
It is a trùism that to know the common law, its history must be known. Our
courts, however, seek enlightenment on the past chiefly in the judgments of
their predecessors . These judgments are rarely treated as single but complex
assessable facts, for the mass of relevdnfdata of which they are merely parts is
usually ignored: In consequence, the antecedent judicial opinion is elevated to
a. status of preposterous importance as a source . Worse than this, the
pronouncement of the bench . . ..becomes authoritative as history. _ . . The
fine gilding ofrationalization conceals the inherent flaws, but it can never avert
the peril that bad history may in turn make bad laws
Holdsworth seemed to disagree when he said that a little bad
history is not too high a price to pay for certainty in the law.7 Perhaps
the justices in the school integration case in the United' States
Supreme, Court would agrees but at least, one English judge has
3 Peters, "Ex pane Clio", p. xiv.
4 Goebel, p. xxxiii .
5 Ibid .
s P . xxxiv .
7 See generally, Parker, The Masochism ofthe Legal Historian (1974), 24 U. of
T. L. J. 279, at p. 288.
s Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, [1965] Sup. Ct Rev . 119.
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recently shown that law and policy could become more rational and
just with some proper historical investigation.'
Goebel also warned us that we would find no assistance in the
writings of the systematic jurists who,
. . . oblivious of the fact that the fruit of a transcendental history may be a
revealed jurisprudence, they are embarrassed only by what cannot be
disciplined into their systems ."
Instead, we need an enlightened historical research which is an
"inquiry animated by a lively appreciation of the law as a cultural
phenomenon, conducted with critical detachment and tolerant of
sources other than those in docket or opinion book" ." He also had
some advice for law reformers ; he hoped that they would "perceive
that a thorough understanding of the historical antecedents of their
problems can be of substantial aid in determining what should be
rooted out and what should be preserved" . 12
When he examined the previous history of criminal procedure,
Goebel complained of the narrowly conceived history which was
"accurate in detail but unreliable in generalization and unintegrated
with the social and political life of the period" . 13 He had the more
specific complaint that the English legal historians' most baleful
influence was found in "the transplantation of the notions of
folkpeace and king's peace into early English law as the basic point
of departure in our criminal procedure" . " This was partly due to the
Victorian cult of Anglo-Saxonism . 15 Felon) , and Misdemeanor
rectifies this and other misconceptions .
Maine had said that the history of the law was secreted in the
interstices of procedure . Goebel also wanted to show the historical
importance of procedure ; its vitality, he said, "lies less in its relative
stability of form than in its responsiveness to change in respect of
function" . 16
s See the dissenting judgments ofLord Diplock inHyam v. D.P.P ., [1975] A.C .
55 and Regina v. Knuller (Publishing etc.) Ltd., [1973] A.C . 436 . Compare a less
satisfactory "historical" examination by Lanham, "Larsonneur Revisited", [1976]
Crim . L. Rev . 276, which raises more historical problems than it solves .
10 P. xxxv .
11 Ibid .
Il P. xxxvii .
13 P. xxxviii.
l' P. xi .
11 P. 2. Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. It (1923), p . 146 said
"England probably had little to learn from Normandy itself, from Norman institutions
and Norman law" . Compare the appreciation of the Frankish pedigree of English law
in Brunner, Entstehung der Schwurgerichte (1872), pp . 127-131 .
16 Goebel, p. 1 .
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One of the most important themes in Goebel's book was his
insistence that the concept of the peace had been exaggerated or, at
least, hadintruded into the history of Anglo-Saxon and English legal
institutions too early . Goebel argued that this misconception was
partly due to the attribution of statehood to primitive organisations
which were not much more than family tribes . Goebel claimed that
the notion of an overall peace-or King's peace-can only be
recognised with the reign of William the Conqueror.17 He also said :
. . . the crown in Henry I's time has a law which is not feudal, and the content
of this law we believe was built up by the Conqueror and his sons by ordinance
and by the maintenance of a monopoly over criminal procedure to the sole use
of the crown .'$
Closely related to the "peace" notion is the question of
outlawry and feud . Goebel contended that the premature "peace"
advocates wanted to give general credence to outlawry as a
manifestation of a breach of the "peace", when outlawry was only
of limited application . Goebel added:
If outlawry is merely withdrawal of legal protection, i.e .essentially a negative
concept, then it is difficult to construe a general duty to pursue and a right or
duty to destroy property . Even under the "shoot-on-sight" theory, there is no
rational explanation offered as to why an outlawry of property is involved so
that it could be destroyed . The whole theory smells of the briefcase.'9
Goebel showed that English law owes much to Frankish law,
and that the evolution of procedure and jurisdiction was not a simple
progression from folk-peace to royal criminal courts . The relative
power of the church and of the local barons, the immunities granted
by the ducal authority and the inter-relationship of land tenure and
jurisdiction over wrong-doing were variables which did not accom-
modate a uniform development .
Historians of crime for later periods have become increasingly
interested in the use of the criminal law as an instrument of public
order." These themes were explored by Goebel in his excellent
introductory chapter "The Foundations of EarlyLawEnforcement" .
In discussing the world of the Germanic tribes, Goebel observed
that there was "reason to doubt whether there is originally involved
at any point any conception of `public' order (excepting the few
" P . 296.
's P. 409.
's P. 100, n. 117.
"E.g . Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in Hay et al ., Albion's
Fatal Tree : Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England (1975.), p . 17 .
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cases, like treason or desertion) either in the sense of a state
guaranteed by law or at least in the sense that such a guarantee was
the aim of primitive regulation . If there is any concept of public
order it is very vague and has its limits in social rather than legal
implications" ."
He suggested that instead of a notion of public order originally
evolving from "peace" or outlawry, "the evolution of procedure for
pacific settlement offered opportunities for the piling up of minute
interferences with the parties' freedom of action that in the end
would add up to a substantial measure of control in the interest of
public order without destroying the idea that a misdeed was
essentially the concern of the kinsman on the two sides" . 22
The private aspect of what we would call criminal justice
remained pre-eminent until the Crown stepped in to cope with two
serious situations which are equally familiar to us a milennium
later-the thief and the professional malefactor .
With the idea of an official interest in some kinds of crime came
the duty imposed upon the citizen to report those kinds of
wrong-doing which could not be subjected to private revenge except
in cases of necessity . Then follows the idea of the inquest . Goebel
commented : " . . . the judge's privilege of questioning and the
inquest's duty of answering tended to increase the state's initiative
and to strengthen the authority already asserted" .23
The state only gradually took an initiative in punishment . At
first it simply exercised supervision over execution which was still
carried out by the aggrieved party or kin . The state eventually
appropriated this function not as much to control the physical
punishment but to assert public order (and make a profit) by means of
confiscation of property . Once again, we must remember that in the
ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries, this assumption of anything like
a central authority is a very precarious power because frequently
local barons were too unruly to be brought to order . Only the
Normans were able to achieve this as a permanent arrangement from
which evolves the English law of felony and misdemeanor .
GRAHAM PARKER*
zi p . 19 .
zz p . 24 .
ss P . 77 .
Graham Parker, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto .
